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Against Posner against Coase against
theory
Uskali Maki*
In two articles published in 1993, Richard Posner characterised and vigorously
attacked Ronald Coase's methodological orientation. Coase resisted Posner's
diagnosis, but did not provide a response. This paper offers a response which Coase
might have given. One of Posner's major claims was that Coase is 'anti-theoretical'
or 'hostile to theory'. Here it is suggested that Posner's allegations suffer from serious
unreflected ambiguities. Once we distinguish between a few different meanings of
'theory* (and 'theoreticity"), and between attitudes and accomplishments in regard
to theory (or between being ann-theoretical, non-theoretical, pro-theoretical, and
theoretical), it becomes possible to argue that Coase does not hold an anti-
theoretical attitude even if his accomplishments fall short of theory in many (but not
all) senses of the word. The larger relevance of this conflict is that its confusions tend
to be characteristic of parts of the economics profession more widely.
I
Intellectual debates are often indispensable for scientific progress, but sometimes they
appear as hopelessly wayward, based on confusion and misunderstanding. The suspicion
easily arises that the latter might be the case in the recent clash between Richard Posner
and Ronald Coase, two prominent economists working on issues where law and
economics meet. To Posner's merciless attack on his methodological views (Posner
1993A, 1993B, 1993C), Coase responded bluntly that Posner has provided 'a highly
inaccurate account of my views' (Coase 1993B, p. 96). Presumably, Coase found the
degree of inaccuracy in Posner's portrayal of himself so annoying that he decided not
really to engage himself in a debate at all. The case was closed before anything close to a
solution was forthcoming. In consequence, we still lack a clear understanding of whether
Posner's account really missed the mark, and, if so, why and how.
There are many important aspects to this confrontation, but in what follows I shall
focus on just one major thread in Posner's critique, namely his allegation that Coase is
misguided in being against theory in economics. Put simply, my argument is that Posner's
account is itself misguided owing to unrecognised ambiguities in the vocabulary he
employs. Sorting out these ambiguities may help others to orient themselves with respect
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to the conflict between the two economists and their ways of doing economics—as well as
the more general issue that Posner vs. Coase exemplifies.
The larger significance of this conflict is also obvious: the notion of theory appears to be
a chronic issue between economists of different persuasions, such as between 'old' and
'new' monetarists and between 'old' and 'new' institutionalists. Whether the notion of
theory is an 'essentially contestable concept' is debatable, but the following scrutiny is
motivated by two characteristics that it appears to share with such concepts. First,
economists feel strongly about this concept; it is loaded with great methodological value
and therefore its use has quite some rhetorical power. Second, it is easy and tempting to
misuse the term 'theory' because of its ambiguity and highly loaded character. My view is
that such misuse is quite extensive among economists, and a focused case study intro-
ducing a few simple distinctions may therefore have relevance for other cases as well.
Posner phrases his claim variously. He refers to Coase's 'antitheoreticar arguments
(1993C, p. 200), his 'disdain for theory', his 'dislike of theory3 (ibid., pp. 205, 209), and
his 'hostility to theory1 (ibid., pp. 205,207). In response, Coase explicitly denies that he is
against theory in economics (Coase, 1993B). Let us see if we can make sense of this issue,
beginning with two fundamental ambiguities in Posner's arguments.1
n
It is puzzling, to say the least, to find Posner attributing to Coase 'disdain for5, 'dislike of
and 'hostility to' theory, while at the same time he classifies some of Coase's work as
'theoretical' (Posner, 1993C, p. 197), characterises Coase's classical articles on the firm
and on social cost as 'theoretical papers' (Posner, 1993A, p. 78), refers to 'Coase's dieory
of transaction costs' being in 'the tradition of simple theory' (Posner, 1993C, p. 205) and
to Coase's case studies being guided by 'basic economic theory5 (ibid., p. 206). There
must be either an inconsistency or an ambiguity in Posner's usage of the terms 'theory'
and 'theoretical'. An inconsistency would arise if there were a single fixed meaning of
'theory' across Posner's comments. I think, however, that it is more plausible to interpret
the puzzle as being created by an ambiguity, to be discussed in a moment. My strategy is
to sort out a number of different meanings in which 'theory' and 'theoretical' are being
used and can be used.
There is another major ambiguity in Posner's attack, and this one is due to a failure to
acknowledge the difference between being anti-theoretical and non-theoretical: that is,
between being against theory as a matter of principle and not being theoretical in one's
actual research work. When we combine this distinction with a number of senses in which
the terms 'theory' and 'theoretical' can be used, we reach a clearer idea of where Coase
stands. It appears that in most cases Coase is, at most, non-theoretical rather than anti-
theoretical. It is notable that it is possible for Coase to be both non-theoretical and pro-
theoretical without inconsistency. While theoreticity and non-theoreticity represent
accomplishments, pro-theoreticity and anti-theoreticity represent attitudes. As we shall see,
Coase's work in many cases exemplifies a pro-theoretical attitude together with a non-
theoretical accomplishment. In some cases, not only is his attitude pro-theoretical, but
also his accomplishment can be characterised as theoretical.
1
 For other reactions to Posner's critique, see Williamson (1993 and 1994).
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ni
Posner's ambiguity is manifest in the two explanations he provides for Coase's presumed
anti-theoreticism. The first explanation concerns Coase's hesitations about conventional
mainstream economic theory:
Hostility to public intervention in markets beyond what is defensible in strict wealth-maximization
terms is thus a leitmotif in Coase's work. The relation between this hostility and his doubts about
modem economic theory is this: so many economic theorists in this century have been inter-
ventionist that economic theory itself has become dominated by concepts, such as 'perfect
competition' (the conditions for which are never satisfied in the real world), 'externality*, 'public
good', 'social welfare function', and 'market failure', that seem like invitations to interventionist
prescriptions. (Posner, 1993C, p. 201)
This is Posner's suggested explanation for the fact that Coase does not accept 'theory',
where 'theory' means a particular economic theory, namely conventional neoclassical
theory. This is the first meaning in which Posner uses the term 'theory' where it is tied to a
particular theoretical substance or conceptual content. Now it does not seem to be at all
clear whether Coase is 'anti-theoretical' in this peculiar sense: Coase's own formulations
turn out to be somewhat ambiguous on this issue. On the one hand, he implies an
affirmative position by saying things such as this: 'What differentiates the essays in this
book is not that they reject existing economic theory.. .but that they employ this economic
theory to examine the role which the firm, the market, and the law play in the working of
the economic system' (Coase, 1988A, p. 5). On the other hand, Coase puts forth a more
radical statement that '[nonetheless, once included in the analysis, they [certain
institutional features of the economic system] will, as I believe, bring about a complete
change in the structure of economic theory' (Coase, 1992, p. 713).
It is obvious that Coase certainly is against some characteristics in conventional
neoclassical theory (such as the central role given to standard price theory formulated in
terms of utility maximisation), but whether he can be regarded as being against this theory
depends on how central we take those characteristics to be for the theory. If we take those
characteristics to constitute the core or 'essence' of conventional neoclassical theory, that
is, if we take them to define what it is for a theory to be conventional neoclassical theory,
then we have to conclude that Coase is 'anti-theoretical' in this peculiar sense. If the
'essence' of conventional theory lies elsewhere, such as in those features of it that Coase
himself finds helpful in his own work (e.g., standard demand and supply analysis), then he
certainly is not against this theory, but only against some of its peripheral characteristics.1
Whatever we should think about this matter, we are here witnessing a clear case of misuse
of the term 'theory1: Posner seems to attempt to monopolise the term as a label for his
favoured type of theory, that is, 'modem economic theory', as he puts it in a rhetorically
skilful way.
It is easy to see that Posner's explanation cited above has little to do with the claim that
Coase is against theory more generally, in senses that are neutral with respect to specific
theoretical substance. There is a second explanation, however, that presupposes such a
1
 There are two debatable issues related to this. One is whether neoclassical economic theory has a unique,
identifiable 'essence' or 'core' with sharp boundaries. The other issue is concerned with what elements belong
to this 'core' provided it exists. Unfortunately, both issues are far too large to be dealt with here. But,
fortunately, it is sufficient for the argument to notice that the disagreement between Posner and Coase is











general disdain for theory. In putting forth this second explanation, Posner refers to what
he calls Coase's 'methodological Englishness' as a reason for the latter's alleged hostility
to theory in general.
Hostility to theory is a bright thread in the carpet of English thought... I am thinking here of the
common sense, empiricist, anti-theoretical tradition in English philosophy that runs from Samuel
Johnson and Locke and Hume to Moore, Ayer, and J. L. Austin. (1993C, p. 205)
As a closer look at the issue will reveal, this suggested explanation is problematic in
a number of ways. Its presupposition, namely the presumption that Coase is anti-
theoretical, is still in multiple ways ambiguous and questionable. Together with the first
explanation, it also fortifies the misleading impression that what ultimately turns out to be
a matter of theoretical disagreement, that is, a matter of being for or against particular
theories, is in fact an issue of being/or or against theory in general.
IV
So let us try to sort out some of the remaining ambiguities regarding Posner's implicit
notion of theory. As an indication of Coase's 'methodological Englishness', Posner refers
to his 'English mistrust of abstraction' (1993C, p. 206). One interpretation of this is that
Posner considers Coase to 'mistrust' general concepts (such as those of the firm and the
market) and general claims (such as those about the nature of the firm and the law of
demand) as opposed to concepts and claims concerned with particular things and
phenomena (such as the organisational history of Union Carbide). This idea is supported
by the following passage:
But the new institutionalists, like their predecessors the old institutionalists, think of institutions in a
grittier sense [than theorists of perfect competition]. They study not 'the market', but the concrete
institutions that enable markets to work—for example, the rules of the Chicago Board of Trade; or
long-term contracts in the uranium industry; or how public utilities set rates; or the terms on which
diamonds are offered to dealers; or the common law system of property rights in animals... Intensive
scrutiny of particular institutions implies in turn an emphasis on the case study... (Posner, 1993A,
p. 76; emphases added)
It is true that Coase thinks that case studies should play an important role in economic
research. And it is clear that Coase's 'emphasis on the case study', the study of
'particular1, 'concrete' institutions at a low level of abstraction on the one hand, and the
'mistrust of abstraction' that Posner attributes to him on the other, would indeed go
together nicely. Unfortunately, Posner misrepresents Coase's position—and the position
of the 'new institutionalists' in general. There should be no doubt that Coase is interested
in institutions both in the concrete and in the abstract; he has studied not only particular
markets and particular firms but also 'the market* and 'the firm' in the abstract. In other
words, he has considered what may be called both marketness (i.e., what it is to be a
market) and firmness (i.e., what it is to be a firm) as well as their particular exemplifi-
cations. In Coase's research strategy, the role of the case study is to serve as an indis-
pensable element in the process of abstraction whereby adequate abstract notions are
pursued (for details, see Maki, 1998A). There is no 'mistrust of abstraction' in Coase; on
the contrary, his work manifests a considerable trust in abstraction! If abstraction is taken
to define rheoreticity, Coase is not anti-theoretical in this sense, not even non-theoretical,
but very much theoretical as regards both his attitudes and accomplishments. He may
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have views about the proper procedures of getting at abstract theory that Posner does not
accept, but this does not support Posner's accusations.
Another perspective on the notion of theory is related to the idea that theories proper
resort to 'theoretical' or 'nonobservational' entities (such as quarks and photons in
physics) to explain observed regularities among phenomena. Suspicion of such unob-
servables has indeed been characteristic of the 'English' tradition of commonsense
empiricism that Posner attributes to Coase. Posner does not cite any evidence in support
of this interpretation of Coase's views but, as it appears, it seems possible to point out an
element in Coase's economic thought that might be used to serve this purpose: namely,
Coase's critique of the assumption of utility maximisation. The interpretation required to
back up Posner's claim is suggested by Coase's statement that
whatever makes men choose as they do, we must be content with the knowledge that for groups of
human beings, in almost all circumstances, a higher (relative) price for anything will lead to a
reduction in the amount demanded... The generalization of such knowledge constitutes price
theory. It does not seem to me to require us to assume that men are rational utility maximizers. On
the other hand, it does not tell us why people choose as they do. (Coase, 1988A, p. 5)
This appears to mean that price theory for Coase consists of empirical generalisations.
As pointed out, one standard idea of theory implies that it is the task of theory to explain
empirical generalisations; theory is something distinct from empirical generalisations and
invokes 'theoretical' or nonobservational entities that are not depicted by those general-
isations but are postulated to explain them. In the case of the generalisation called the law
of demand, economists have traditionally introduced a distinct 'theoretical' entity called
'utility' and assumed that people maximise it, and this is construed as part of a
'theoretical' explanation of the law of demand. Coase rejects this idea by saying that utility
is 'a nonexistent entity which plays a part similar, I suspect, to that of ether in the old
physics' (ibid., p. 2). This would seem to give us reason to conclude that Coase's approach
is anti-theoretical in the sense of exemplifying some kind of empiricist reductionism:
theories reduce to empirical generalizations.
Once again, even though there is evidence for the foregoing conclusion in Coase's
writings, an alternative interpretation suggests itself that portrays Coase as non-
theoretical rather than anti-theoretical in this sense. This interpretation is supported by
Coase's conjecture that 'ultimately the work of sociobiologists (and their critics) will
enable us to construct a picture of human nature in such detail that we can derive the set
of preferences with which economists start' (ibid., p. 4). Such a theory would 'relate
preferences to certain basic needs' (Coase, 1978, p. 244). Thus, Coase seems to be
dissatisfied with the current conventional theoretical explanation of the law of demand,
rather than excluding the idea of pursuing a theoretical explanation in general. He even
seems to have realist grounds for his position: since he does not believe utility is a really
existing entity, he prefers to do without it until something more reliably real (as well as
explanatory) has been postulated in its stead. This is further supported by Coase's
suggestion that utility is similar to ether in physics, something that the progress of science
will reject as a non-existent entity. There is nothing anti-theoretical in this; on the
contrary, it represents a strongly pro-theoretical attitude. It is a pro-theoretical attitude
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together with a non-theoretical accomplishment: Coase has not provided a biologically
informed theory of needs.
This same conclusion, supported by the example of the law of demand, can be reached
at a more general level. Namely, Posner's allegation of Coase's radical empiricism, the
latter's 'methodological Englishness', does not fit with Coase's idea of theories purporting
to 'get to the essence of what was going on in the economic system' (Coase, 1988C,
p. 68). A radical empiricist would not accept essences into the ontology of economics,
since they are not available to sense experience. It is most intriguing to observe that it is
Posner's view that is closer to 'methodological Englishness' in this respect. Posner is
content with theories that predict well without describing correctly the mechanisms that
generate the phenomena predicted: 'A model can be a useful tool of discovery even if it is
unrealistic, just as Ptolemy's astronomical theory was a useful tool of navigation...even
though its basic premise was false... We should be pragmatic about theory. It is a tool,
rather than a glimpse of ultimate truth, and the criterion of a tool is its utility' (Posner,
1993A,p. 77).'
Against this, Coase says,' [fj aced with a choice between a theory which predicts well but
gives us little insight into how die system works and one which gives us this insight but
predicts badly, I would choose the latter' (Coase, 1988C, p. 64). Coase's rejection of the
instrumentalist view of dieories is clear-cut: 'But a theory is not like an airline or bus
timetable. We are not interested simply in die accuracy of its predictions. A theory also
serves as a base of thinking. It helps us to understand what is going on' (Coase, 1988C,
p. 64). Coase is here suggesting that while bus timetables may be useful in predicting the
behaviour of buses, they fail to give us a plausible idea about die mechanisms and
processes diat keep buses running as they do. On the odier hand, Posner's view of dieories
seems to be such a 'timetable view'. His instrumentalist reluctance to go behind the veil of
experience to see 'how die world works' is an expression of anti-realist empiricism about
how dieories work.2
Looked upon from diis perspective, two conclusions can be drawn. First, the concept of
theory allows for both an instrumentalist and a non-instrumentalist (i.e., realist) version.
Posner cannot justifiably claim that if one does not hold an instrumentalist conception of
theory, one is against theory. Second, it is rather the other way around: diere is a sense in
which we may say diat if one holds a certain kind of instrumentalist view of dieory, one is
against theory. The Coasean view of theory as a penetrating account of 'how the world
works' gives dieory a powerful role and an irreducible status, while Posner's instru-
mentalist conception downplays dieory and gives it just a timetable status. Timetables
can in principle be formulated in terms of empirical generalisations; dius, perhaps
surprisingly, it is Posner who is closer to die kind of anti-dieoretical empiricism diat he
wrongly attributes to Coase.
VI
It is not clear diat the concept of theory is linked to diat of approximation, but a remark
on this may be worth making in passing. Posner makes diis peculiar statement: 'The
formal models of economics hold only as approximations. Coase is not interested in
1
 Posner is mistaken if he thinks that the two options he mentions, namely theory as 'a false but useful tool'
and theory as 'a glimpse of ultimate truth', exhaust the options. One can avoid instrumentalism without
possessing or pursuing ultimate truths.
2
 However, unlike Coase, Posner does not seem to be an empiricist about how theories are generated.
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approximations. He is interested in observable reality5 (Posner, 1993C, p. 206). The
claim about Coase being only interested in observable reality is undermined by the
observations given above. The claim about Coase not being interested in 'approxi-
mations'—whatever this expression is supposed to mean in this context—is undermined
by two quotations from well-known sources. In 'The Nature of the Firm', Coase says that
the definition of the firm he has developed in that article 'closely approximates the firm as
it is considered in the real world' (Coase, 1937, p. 404). In 'The Problem of Social Cost',
Coase argues that '[a] better approach would seem to be to start our analysis with a
situation approximating that which actually exists' (Coase, 1960, p. 43).
vn
Yet another variation in Posner's usage of'theory5 is to link it to the idea of mathematical
formalisation. He argues that Coase '[will not] allow a place for formal theory' (Posner,
1993C, p. 206) and that Coase is 'wrong [in being] against formal theory' (Posner,
1993A, p. 78). To get things straight, the first remark to be made on this is that we are
talking here about one style of theorising or one type of theory, that is, mathematically
formalised theory, not theory in general. The property of being formalized cannot be
taken to constitute a necessary condition of the property of being theoretical, even though
some economists appear to think so, thus misusing the term 'theory'. However, this is not
the primary issue at hand.1 The more restricted question to be answered is this: is Coase
against mathematically formalised theory as Posner claims?
It is true that Coase has admitted that, early in his career, mathematics 'was not to my
taste' (Coase, 1993A, p. 36); it is also true that he ridicules the role that mathematics may
play in conventional economics as follows: 'In my youth it was said that that what was too
silly to be said may be sung. In modern economics it may be put into mathematics'
(Coase, 1988B, p. 185). However, none of this in itself implies that he is against
mathematical formalisation. Quite the contrary is the case. Coase puts his view about the
role of mathematics in economics rather clearly:
My remarks have sometimes been interpreted as implying that I am hostile to the mathemarization
of economic theory. This is untrue. Indeed, once we begin to uncover the real factors affecting the
performance of the economic system, the complicated interrelations between them will clearly
necessitate a mathematical treatment, as in the natural sciences, and economists like myself, who
write in prose, will take their bow. May this period soon come. (Coase, 1992, p. 719)
In other words, Coase believes mathematical formalisation is needed, but not before
economists have got the fundamental abstractions right. Since Coase does not think
conventional theory has got all the basic abstractions quite right, he is not particularly
impressed by what he regards as little more than formally elegant 'blackboard economics'
(for a detailed analysis of this notion of Coase's, see Maki, 1998A). The disagreement
between Coase and Posner is therefore not over mathematical formalisation itself, but
once again over theoretical substance. Again, the conclusion is that Coase is not anti-
theoretical in the peculiar sense of being against mathematically formalised theory as a
general principle, but rather holds a pro-theoretical attitude, subject to a constraint, even
1
 Two other issues are related to this. One is whether mathematical formalisation is at all appropriate in
economics. The other is concerned with the specific kind of mathematics that would be appropriate, provided











though the accomplishments of his own research are non-theoretical in the present sense.
The constraint is the principle that a formalised theory should be based on adequate
abstractions; it should represent the real rather than an imaginary world. Coase writes that
his 'analytical scheme can be put into mathematical form. This should give us hope but
only if this analytical power is used to enlighten us about the real rather than an imaginary
world' (Coase, 1993A, p. 73). We might want to say that Coase's own theoretical accom-
plishments are concerned with ensuring that this constraint be satisfied by trying to get the
fundamental abstractions right.
vra
Another variation to be considered is the idea that 'being theoretical' somehow connotes
'completed theory'. Posner says that Coase 'has not attempted to develop a theory of
transaction costs' (Posner, 1993C, p. 207). Coase is very well aware of this circumstance.
In his Nobel Lecture he cites Williamson's suggestion that 'the non-use or limited use of
my thesis in 'The Nature of the Firm' [is due] to the fact that...the concept of transaction
costs has not been incorporated into a general theory', and admits that 'I think this is
correct' (Coase, 1992, p. 718). Once again, Coase is certainly not anti-theoretical in the
sense of being against completed theory. Even though his accomplishment has been non-
theoretical in this peculiar sense, he holds a strongly pro-theoretical attitude, as evidenced
by the following: 'My dream is to construct a theory which will enable us to analyze the
determinants of the institutional structure of production... My dream is to help complete
what I started some fifty-five years ago and to take part in the development of such a
comprehensive theory5 (Coase, 1993A, p. 73).
EX
It remains to be noticed that there has to be a loose notion of theory and theoreticity that is
shared by Posner and Coase and that both attribute to Coase. Otherwise none of Coase's
work could be characterised by Posner as 'theoretical', guided by 'basic theory' and
leading to 'theory'. Otherwise it would be unintelligible for Coase to characterise the
situation prior to 1937 by saying that 'what was lacking in the literature [on industrial
organisation], or so I thought, was a theory', and that his 1937 article was written to fill the
gap (Coase, 1988 [1972], pp. 61-2); or to criticise the older stream of institutionalist
economics for anti-theoreticism by stating that 'the American institutionalists were not
theoretical but anti-theoretical... Without a theory, they had nothing to pass on except a
mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire' (Coase, 1984, p. 230).' The
minimal notions of theory and theoreticity implied in such passages have to connote, in
positive terms, something like 'conceptual' and 'explanatory', and, in negative terms,
something like 'unlike data' and 'different from empirical case study". It is also likely that
there is more than such a minimal notion at play here. There is a sense in which Coase is
not only pro-theoretical in his attitudes but also theoretical in his achievements.2
1
 It is a separate issue whether Coase is correct in this characterisation of (at least all of) the 'old'
institutionalist economics. For discussions of the issue of theoreticity in the context of the new and
old institutionalism, see Mfikd (1993, pp. 19-25) and Rutherford (1994).
2
 Many of Coase's metatheoretical papers have been collected in Coase (1994). For further discussions on
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10.
This was Coase's reaction to Posner's allegations: 'How Posner came to interpret my
position as being anti-theoretical I cannot imagine. It is certainly untrue' (Coase, 1993B,
p. 97.) The foregoing examination might make it easier to imagine—even if not to accept.
Posner's unreflected and misguided exploitation of the ambiguity of the strategically
loaded terms 'theory' and 'theoretical' may be an extreme exemplification of a mal-
practice obtaining among economists, but insofar as it is an exemplification of such a
practice at all, its critical examination might have broader consequences.
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